The outbreak and subsequent worldwide spread of pandemic influenza H1N1, popularly known as 'swine flu', from the spring of 2009 has illustrated our continued microbial vulnerability in a highly interconnected aeromobile world. The UK has been particularly affected by the first 'wave' of infection, with some commentators suggesting this was an inevitable consequence of the country's status as a hub of global air communications. Given that the virus was almost certainly brought to the UK by holidaymakers returning from Mexico, the role of the UK airport as the 'first line' of defence against the importation of infectious disease has been subject to particular scrutiny. An important debate has subsequently emerged surrounding the 'rights' of airline passengers to move unimpeded through the world's airports (without being subjected to medical screening) against the 'rights' of individual nations to be protected from the spread of infection through the employment of 'strict' screening practices.
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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ reported as far afield as Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel, and Australia. In the United Kingdom, a country that was subsequently particularly affected by the first 'wave' of infection, the Chief Medical Officer predicted that as many as 65,000 people could die as a result of contracting the virus and the National Health Service began a costly and controversial programme of vaccine procurement and administration (Laurance 2009; Gregory, 2009) . Significantly, almost from the start of the outbreak, articles in the UK broadsheet press (the so-called 'quality' newspapers) discussed the role of aviation in the virus's worldwide spread and explained H1N1's rapid transmission as a consequence of infected airline passengers unwittingly transporting the virus around the world (Ayres et al, 2009; Hickman, 2009) . Hence, from an early stage, the airport (and UK airports in particular) was identified as a site of particular risk.
In an effort to contain the spread of the virus, national health authorities around the globe, including those in the UK, were torn between a bio-political imperative to try to slow the virus's spread by introducing travel restrictions and/or new health screening procedures at airports without unduly hindering international travel and trade. As later sections of this paper show, some nations employed particular health security technologies, such as thermal imaging cameras, at their international airports to inspect the core body temperatures of all airline passengers arriving from infected areas, while others implemented rigorous quarantine and/or medical detention measures.
As a result of these different ideological and practical approaches, an important debate emerged concerning the 'rights' of individual nations to be protected from the spread of infectious disease by air through their airports and the 'rights' of airline passengers to move unimpeded through the world's airports (without being subjected to intrusive medical screening).
Structure and content of the paper
The paper begins with a review of the existing literature on air travel, globalisation, and practices of global health security. It then examines the worldwide response to the H1N1 pandemic, focusing first on the health security protocols invoked at international airports overseas and then on the role UK passenger airports played as the 'first line' of defence against the spread of the infection. In order to examine the debate surrounding the 'rights' of individual nations to be protected from the spread of infection against the 'rights' of airline passengers to move unimpeded through the world's airports, we apply concepts of 'value' and 'cost' to individual 'forms of life' to consider how the governance of H1N1 risk at UK airports has generated a set of complex and interlocking biopolitical and ethical concerns associated with the safeguarding of the national border. We conclude by suggesting how this tension, between securing and ethically valuing life, may be designed into future UK policy responses to infectious disease control at its international airports.
We contend that policy transfer may provide a theoretical framework to connect these perspectives in a way that may improve existing port health practices.
Air travel and infectious disease
Modern society is characterised by, and arguably largely dependent upon, the rapid and routine mobility of people and goods across vast distances. However, while globalisation has improved opportunities for travel and trade and enabled us to visit overseas countries and experience foreign cultures with relative ease, this interdependency is increasing the opportunities for the international spread of infectious diseases. Numerous medical and scientific studies have established clear relationships between the spatialities of the commercial aviation network and the global transmission of infectious disease (Royal and McCoubrey, 1989; Gerard, 2002; Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Singer, 2005; Bowen and Laroe, 2006; Colizza et al, 2006; House of Lords, 2007) , and recent research by Budd, Bell and Brown (2009) While international efforts to control the spread of infectious disease date back to the use of quarantine in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the development of regular long-haul air travel during the twentieth century necessitated the formation of new sanitary measures specifically targeted at aviation (see Budd et al, 2009) . These regulations, which developed as a result of provisions contained within the First Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933, progressively defined new approaches for the identification and management of the threats posed by the 'classic' pestilential disease of cholera, smallpox, yellow fever, plague, and typhus to prevent their spread by air. Many of these approaches relied on interventions that were performed at or before the airport, including vaccination, disinsection (the eradiation of insects aboard aircraft using chemical insecticides), and disinfection. However, as the network of long-haul air routes, and the number of passengers using the new services, grew during the latter half of the twentieth century, safeguarding public health from the threat of infectious diseases being spread by air became increasingly challenging and a raft of new national and international legislation was introduced to try and counter new disease threats and cope with rising numbers of travellers.
Recent research by Wallis and Nerlich (2005) and Nerlich and Halliday (2007) has highlighted the difficulties often faced by national governments when trying to control the spread of infectious disease and Collier and Lakoff (2008) have 'problematized' the threat infectious diseases pose to a nation's health as 'biosecurity'. The concept of biosecurity -a broad title given to technical and political efforts to safeguard human and animal health -has become a prominent site of enquiry as researchers seek to understand various forms of expertise and practices through which disease threats are articulated and managed (Collier et al, 2004; Collier and Lakoff, 2008; . Two literatures are of particular relevance here. Firstly, emerging scholarly research focusing on the regulation of the international body in transit as it travels across the globe (Mangili and Gendreau, 2005; Tatem and Hay, 2007; Budd et al, 2009 ). Secondly, the work describing interventions employed by different nations on the ground to safeguard national biosecurity, particularly in response to new and emerging pathogenic threats (Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Fearnley, 2008; Nerlich et al, 2009 ).
Within these broad literatures, the international airport has been described as a site of command and control, where the movement of individual mobile bodies can be mapped and different identities can be ascribed (Salter, 2007; Adey, 2009; Budd et al, forthcoming) . Much of this work has focused on anti-terrorist screening measures rather than disease (Adey, 2009; Amoore and Hall, 2009 ) and on the security practices employed by major airports overseas (Salter, 2007; Bennett, 2008) . Nevertheless, we argue that the ascription of this role to UK airports has assumed greater importance during the last two decades, not least because the progressive liberalisation of the country's commercial aviation sector has multiplied the number of potential entry points through which 'exotic' diseases may enter its territory. This has had the effect of placing the border at the regions (Budd et al, forthcoming; Warren et al, forthcoming) .
Taken together, the extant literatures on commercial aviation, international disease regulation and biosecurity raise key questions about the regulation of the traveller's journey. They include the complexities involved in managing risk at various scales -international, national and regional -and the role assumed by the airport as a site of control. By examining risk and control in relation to the passenger journey during the early months of the H1N1 pandemic, we found that the concepts of 'value' and 'cost' assisted in our understanding of the dilemmas involved in safeguarding the health of the individual and the nation at UK airports.
Managing risk at the airport -the varying international response to the H1N1 pandemic
International responses to the spread of pandemic influenza H1N1 have varied. Some of the measures that were invoked, including compulsory quarantine, isolation, and medical detention, may be interpreted as rather more 'aggressive' than 'softer' techniques involving self-declaration health questionnaires and fever scanning. However, all of these practices demonstrated the complex role assumed by the airport in facilitating (human) mobility on the one hand and seeking to prevent the 'wrong' sort of human or disease mobility on the other. Typically, these measures involved the use of a health screening technology (particular thermal imaging cameras) and/or regulatory instruments that can result in the isolation and detention of individual travellers. Visitors required to complete health declaration cards.
Thermal scans of arriving passengers.
Indonesia
Temperature scans installed at 10 airports. Japan Thermal imaging cameras installed to screen arriving passengers.
Philippines
Temperature screening of all passengers from countries with reported H1N1
cases.
Singapore Thermal screening of all passengers arriving from the USA.
Thailand Thermal scanning and maintenance of a database of foreign visitors.
Vietnam Thermal scans of passengers arriving from the USA, Canada, and Mexico.
Source: Data derived from Reuters UK (2009a , 2009b Mexico, the reported source of the pandemic outbreak, was one of the first nations to introduce health screening measures at its international airports. (Wong, 2009 ).
The governance of pandemic H1N1 risk at UK airports
In the UK, the powers for applying health security measures on commercial aircraft and at airports The main statutory responsibility for implementing the Port Health Regulations at the UK border at seaports, international railway stations, and airports rests with the local authority in which the transport facility is sited. Some local authorities in areas of heightened transportation activity are specifically designated as Port Health Authorities (PHAs). These PHAs were created in the second half of the nineteenth century to perform Port Health functions at entry points to the UK with the aim of preventing the international dissemination of dangerous communicable diseases, initially by ships, but now also by international rail and air services. The task of providing or commissioning specialist staff to implement the Port Health Regulations at (air/sea)ports in the UK rests with the Local Authority, the local Primary Care Trust (a division of the NHS in England that provides some primary and community health services), or the Health Protection Agency. The majority of staff employed by these institutions are either registered medical practitioners or certified environmental health officers.
As Budd et al (forthcoming) highlight, the relatively recent introduction of regular international air services to and from UK regional airports has meant that some local authorities in the UK (simply by virtue of having an airport located within their administrative boundaries) have had to quickly assume a Port Health function. Between 1948 and 2008, the number of UK airports handling international services increased from eight to 41, with the majority of these new flights being introduced within the last decade (see DfT, 2005) . This change to the spatial pattern of international air service provision was the result of a UK Government policy that sought to promote the growth of UK regional airports by liberalising the bilateral air service agreements that had previously regulated the routes that could be flown from each airport (DfT, 2003) . As well as enabling existing UK carriers to launch new international routes, the UK Government also encouraged foreign airlines to begin operating new international services from regional airports (DfT, 2005) . At the time of writing, Emirates of the UAE, Pakistan International Airlines, and Continental Airlines of the United States, among others, now operate regular long-haul international services to/from a number of UK regional airports including Birmingham, Newcastle and Glasgow. As a consequence of assuming this relatively new role as sites of long-haul international aeromobility, Budd et al (forthcoming) have suggested that the provisions for safeguarding public health at some regional airports may be less well defined than those at major London facilities which have had more experience at dealing with the public health challenges associated with regular long-haul air travel.
At present, much of the current Port Health surveillance strategy at UK airports is covert and relies on the visual inspection of departing and arriving passengers by check-in agents, cabin crew, and immigration officers, irrespective of the traveller's origin or destination. The procedural logic of airports means that there are only two channels -immigration and customs -through which all arriving passengers must pass. This obliges any point of entry health screening to be performed at one of these locations. At present, responsibility for identifying potentially infected/infectious travellers lies with individual immigration officers, who must assess both the originality and veracity of immigration documents and also whether each individual traveller poses a health security risk.
Current protocols dictate that travellers not possessing an EU, North American, Australian, New
Zealand or other 'Western' passport will be subject to more scrutiny (from both an immigration and an epidemiological perspective) than those that do. Moreover, continued UK government concern about the threat posed by tuberculosis means that chest radiography is the only medical screening technology that is routinely employed to safeguard public health at UK airports (HPA, 2006b ).
The benefits of introducing additional screening technologies, particularly thermal imaging cameras, have been periodically debated in response to new and emerging disease threats. In response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak, some commentators called for the same technologies that are used at some airports overseas to be installed in the UK (see Warren et al, forthcoming) . argued that biosecurity could be best thought of as 'a specific problematization of conventional ways of dealing with living matters of concern ' (2008: 190) . Problematization -often associated with the work of Foucault (Dillon, 2007 ) -refers to the addressing of events or situations 'not as a given but as a question' (Collier and Lakoff, 2008: 11) . Our recent work sought to question port health measures enacted at airports with a view to informing future practices. In this respect, we located 'value(s)' in terms of: freedom of individual movement; economic and societal 'cost'; and ethics.
The attraction of air travel can be in a large part explained by the opportunities it affords for individual mobility across spaces. The airport has, in academic and popular literature alike, been portrayed in an optimistic light as 'spaces of flows' (Castells, 1996) , frontiers that are not at the territorial limit, glamorous gateways to other places and grounded sites that encourage mobility (Salter, 2007 (Salter, , 2008 . Although academic research is beginning to contest this somewhat naïve perspective, with scholars drawing particular attention to 'social sorting' and 'preemptive securitisation' of the travelling body (Lyon, 2007; Adey, 2009) (Sheller, 2008: 27; Lyon, 2008) . Nevertheless, existing 'postmodern' trends in airport design -with an emphasis on 'refashioning of nonplace' (Lloyd, 2003: 101) -have resulted in airports being rebranded as places of entertainment and 'pleasurable waiting' (Lloyd, 2003) . This allows for a new kind of engagement between traveller and airport, with the latter being perceived as more site for the expression of consumerist 'value(s)' that define the freedoms of a marketdriven society rather than the restrictions of a surveillance society (Lloyd, 2003; Kesselring, 2008) .
Indeed, our study found little evidence that biosecurity practices had -at least in the instance of 'Western' travellers -obstructed passenger motilities or reduced levels of consumption.
Enabling these values (personal mobility and personal consumption) has nevertheless resulted in an economic 'cost'. Whilst adequate port health provision is a statutory requirement, it does not represent a valuable revenue stream for the airport. This is compounded by practical problems associated with providing effective port health safeguards. As a direct consequence of recent terrorist attacks against commercial aircraft and airports, all available space in the security search area has been devoted to anti-terrorist security measures meaning there is insufficient scope to provide port health professionals with any space in which to conduct routine passenger health screening. Likewise, on arrival, airport immigration and customs halls are designed to expedite the processing of potential entrants into the UK and intercept contraband good respectively.
Consequently, very few sites have sufficient space to install entry-screening technologies.
Notwithstanding this, there may be scope for introducing some sort of mobile screening technology that could be moved to different boarding gates as required to screen passengers as they disembark from 'high risk' flights. Arguably, the 'cost' incurred in providing port health facilities is dwarfed by the broader, societal, cost of inaction. Estimates of the impact of the H1N1 pandemic on the UK vary from a few million to £50bn, with a report in summer 2009 suggesting that the outbreak had set back UK economic recovery by several years (O'Grady, 2009 '…new forms of political and ethical reasoning that take into account questions that are often only implicit in discussions of biosecurity interventions' (Collier and Lakoff, 2008, p, 28) An analysis of UK press reporting of H1N1 pandemic influenza undertaken by the authors uncovered an emerging discourse on the 'ethical' long-haul traveller Kraut, 1995) . It also contrasted with earlier UK national media discourse surrounding the 2001 TB outbreak in Leicester, which had been dominated by the need to control 'diseased' bodies wishing to enter the country (Bell et al, 2006) .
UK airports and the spread of disease: future policy responses
These changed geographies of health security require new responses from the policy community.
We argue that there is a need for more integrated biosecurity measures taking into account the infrastructures and resources of airports sited in the localities as well as in the global cities. Despite a large body of theoretical risk-based literature (for example, Amoore, 2006; Adey, 2009 ) and recent global outbreaks of infectious disease (SARS, H1N1), little attempt has been made to assess how health security is being enacted at individual airports in the UK and the extent to which existing practices may be improved. We suggest that one step towards achieving at least the latter may be through policy transfer: '[a] process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies within another' (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 357) .
This process has been used to develop frameworks to advance earlier debates about the movement of ideas and practices in public and social policy (Ison, 2009) . We believe that this existing work can provide a valuable theoretical framework to connect perspectives on health security. Ultimately, it could be used to inform the development of a decision support tool against which current UK airport practices can be measured and improved, taking into account policy work in other jurisdictions (Hulme, 2005) .
Conclusion
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic highlighted the UK's continued epidemiological vulnerability to infectious disease. Given that the virus was almost certainly brought to the UK by holidaymakers returning from Mexico, the role of the UK airport as the 'first line' of defence against the importation of infectious disease has been subject to particular scrutiny. This resulted in an important debate concerning the 'rights' of airline passengers to move unimpeded through the world's airports and the 'rights' of individual nations to be protected from the spread of infection through the employment of 'strict' screening practices. Focusing on concepts of 'value' and 'cost', as applied to individual 'forms of life', the paper considered how the governance of H1N1 risk at UK airports has generated a set of complex and interlocking biopolitical and ethical concerns associated with the safeguarding of the national border. Finally, we suggest that acknowledging this tension, between securing and ethically valuing life, could help inform future policy responses to the control of infectious diseases at UK airports.
